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Abstract 
We study income responses to income tax changes by using a large panel of Swedish 
tax payers over the period 1991–2002. Changes in statutory tax rates as well as dis-
cretionary changes in tax bracket thresholds provide exogenous variations in tax rates 
that can be used to identify income responses. We estimate dynamic income models 
which allow us to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects in a straight-
forward fashion. For men, the estimates of the long-run elasticity of income with respect 
to the net-of-tax rate hover in a range between 0.10 and 0.30. The estimates for women 
are imprecise and statistically insignificant. We simulate the fiscal consequences of a 
tax reform that reduces the top marginal tax rate by five percentage points. Such a 
reform may have negligible effects on tax revenues even for relatively small elasticities 
when the interactions between income taxes and other taxes are taken into account. 
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1  Introduction 
Research on the behavioral effects of labor taxation has largely focused on the impact 
on hours of work and labor force participation. More recently, a literature has emerged 
that focuses on the impact on taxable income and other measures of income. One reason 
for this new direction is that taxes may affect individual behavior along a number of 
margins in addition to the effects on hours of work and participation, such as work 
effort and job mobility. By examining the impact on income, one could arguably 
capture a wider set of responses than those studied in traditional labor supply studies. 
The new literature is mainly based on U.S. data and has so far not converged to a con-
sensus view regarding the quantitative magnitudes of the behavioral responses. Studies 
of income responses to changes in tax rates have rarely focused on European exp-
eriences. 
The present paper highlights the distinction between short-run and long-run respon-
ses by estimating dynamic models using panel data. Previous research has in general 
been vague as to whether the estimated elasticities of interest have pertained to the short 
run or the long run. In fact, the modeling approaches commonly used have not been 
adequate for distinguishing between short-run and long-run responses. Our study pro-
vides the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the impact of Swedish tax changes 
subsequent to the major reforms in 1990–91. These changes have been targeted at high-
income earners and involved tax hikes as well as tax cuts. 
We make use of a large panel data set that comprises information for 12 years, 
namely 1991–2002. We identify the effects of income tax changes on income by exp-
loiting two main sources of exogenous variations in the tax rules. First, changes in the 
statutory tax rates have occurred in 1995 as well as in 1999. Second, the “kinks” of the 
progressive tax schedule have been subject to discretionary changes which induce exo-
genous changes in marginal tax rates for a given level of income. 
The broad features of the Swedish tax system have remained largely intact since the 
early 1990s when the “tax reform of the century” was introduced. This major reform 
involved substantial simplifications and base broadening of the tax system. One key 
element was the introduction of a two-tiered marginal tax schedule for earned income. 4  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
The idea was that most income earners should pay only the proportional municipality 
tax (hovering around 30 percent). For incomes above a certain threshold, a state tax 
kicked in at the marginal rate of 20 percent. The state tax was raised to 25 percent in 
1995. From 1999 and onwards, the state tax has comprised two levels, viz. 20 and 25 
percent. 
A noteworthy element of the Swedish tax system is its treatment of the individual, 
rather than the family, as the basic tax unit. The tax schedule for earned income pertains 
to individual income and is independent of spousal income. Another notable element is 
the so-called dual income tax system, i.e., the fact that earned income and capital in-
come are subject to different tax treatments: earned income is subject to progressive 
taxes whereas income from capital is taxed at the flat rate of 30 percent. 
The conventional approach to the estimation of income responses to tax changes has 
involved regressing changes in log income on changes in the log of the net-of-tax rate, 
where the net-of-tax rate is defined as one minus the marginal tax rate. This regression 
framework in first differences is typically, implicitly or explicitly, derived from a rela-
tionship between the levels of income and marginal tax rate. However, the “difference 
specification” in the regression models implicitly assumes immediate adjustment to 
changes in tax policy. If the adjustment is gradual rather than immediate, the model is 
misspecified. 
Our approach also posits a relationship between income and tax rate levels but allows 
for lagged adjustment. This leads to an “error correction” specification which encom-
passes the conventional regression model as a special case and yields estimates of short-
run as well as long-run responses. A dynamic specification can be rationalized from 
several considerations. First, there may be lags in the diffusion of information about 
changes in tax policy. Second, individual behavior may exhibit “habit persistence”, an 
idea that has a long tradition in studies of consumer demand. The hypothesis is that the 
individual gauges his consumption (or labor supply) against some benchmark that in 
part depends on her own behavior in the past.
1
                                                 
1 See Johnson and Pencavel (1984) for an empirical implementation of this idea in a study of labor supply. 
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changes in hours worked.
2 For example, a change in working time may require a switch 
to a new employer. Fourth, to the extent that tax changes affect human capital invest-
ment, the earnings response will not be immediate.
3
2  Previous research 
 
For men, our estimates of the long-run income elasticity with respect to the net-of-
tax rate range between 0.10 and 0.30. For women, the estimates are imprecise and 
statistically insignificant. We simulate the implications for government revenues of a 
tax reform that reduces the top marginal tax rate by five percentage points. Such a 
reform may have negligible effects on tax revenues even for relatively small elasticities. 
An important reason for this outcome is the presence of interactions between income 
taxes and other taxes, such as payroll taxes. A cut in the top marginal tax rate brings 
about higher incomes which in turn are associated with higher tax revenues from in-
come as well as payroll taxes. 
2.1  Theoretical issues 
The research on income responses to tax changes has several forerunners. One strand 
consists of the large literature on labor supply which focuses on how taxes affect hours 
of work and labor force participation. This literature builds on the canonical model of 
labor supply, where wage rates are taken as given and individual choices are dictated by 
preferences and budget restrictions (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, for a survey of 
this research). A smaller and more recent literature has examined how wage rates re-
spond to changes in the tax system in imperfectly competitive labor markets. In this 
literature, hours of work are determined by the worker (as in the canonical model) or 
through some bargaining mechanism, whereas wages may be set by firms (as in effi-
ciency wage models) or through individual or collective bargaining (as in search models 
or trade union models). 
                                                 
2 Formal models of dynamic labor supply with explicit costs of adjustment are rare in the literature. The paper by Nadiri 
and Roach (1974) is one of the exceptions. 
3 There is a somewhat related literature on the effects of transitory and permanent capital-gains tax changes; see 
Burman and Randolph (1994). 6  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
The focus on how taxes affect income is motivated by the view that taxes may have a 
multitude of effects on individual behavior in addition to the traditional labor supply 
responses. This view emphasizes that traditional estimates of the labor supply respon-
siveness to tax rates may substantially underestimate the overall effect, the reason being 
that individual adjustments along other margins are ignored. Taxes may affect work 
effort, what type of jobs that are accepted, and incentives for geographical and occupa-
tional mobility. This line of argument has been articulated by Martin Feldstein in a 
series of papers; see Feldstein (1995a, 1995b, 1999). A normative conclusion that 
follows from this perspective is that tax distortions are more serious, the higher the 
elasticity of taxable income is with respect to changes in tax rates. Indeed, Feldstein 
(1999) shows that the elasticity can be used to compute the deadweight loss from 
income taxes. 
The  literature on how wages are affected by the tax system in imperfect labor 
markets has paid particular attention to the role of higher tax progressivity, i.e., the 
impact of a rise in the marginal tax rate relative to the average tax rate. A common 
result in a variety of models is that higher tax progressivity leads to wage moderation, 
which in turn will bring about a fall in equilibrium unemployment. The intuition for this 
result is perhaps most easily seen in a bargaining model, where a higher marginal tax 
rate raises the cost of wage increases and leads the parties in the bargain to opt for lower 
wages. Although the result is reasonably robust across a variety of models and specific 
assumptions, it is not completely robust.
4 So in the end and as usual, empirical work is 
needed to establish how taxes affect wages, hours and labor income. By and large, the 
empirical literature tends to confirm that increased tax progressivity is conducive to 
wage moderation, but there are also some conflicting results.
5
The normative implications of estimated elasticities of income with respect to tax 
rates will generally depend on what is assumed about labor market imperfections. High 
elasticities reflect potentially large tax distortions from the perspective of the traditional 
 
                                                 
4  Contributions to the theoretical literature on taxes in imperfectly competitive labor markets include Hoel (1990), 
Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), Lockwood and Manning (1993), Pissarides (1998), Hansen (1999), Sorensen (1999), 
Fuest and Huber (2000) and Sandemann Rasmussen (2002). Bovenberg (2003) provides a comprehensive treatment. 
5  Contributions to the empirical literature include Lockwood and Manning (1993), Holmlund and Kolm (1995), 
Wulfsberg (1997) and Lockwood et al (2000). IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  7 
model. In a bargaining model, by contrast, a rise in the marginal tax rate that leads to 
wage moderation and to a decline in overall income may conceivably be welfare impro-
ving via the associated increase in employment. Indeed, there is typically an optimal 
degree of tax progressivity in models of imperfect labor markets; see Holmlund and 
Kolm (1995) and Sorensen (1999) for elaborations of this idea. 
The recent literature on income responses to tax rates has typically been framed 
within the context of the canonical model, where income responses are viewed as the 
outcome of individual labor supply choices rather than individual or collective bar-
gaining. However, in reality incomes are presumably influenced partly by individual 
choice and partly by bargaining mechanisms. 
2.2  Empirical research on income responses to tax changes 
The empirical literature on the responses of taxable income to changes in tax rates was 
pioneered by Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995a, 1995b). The key parameter of 
interest in their  studies as well as in the subsequent literature was the elasticity of 
taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, i.e., one minus the marginal tax rate. 
This elasticity – ETI for short – was found to be remarkably high in these early studies 
which exploited data from U.S. tax reforms in the 1980s. Lindsey reported ETIs in a 
range between 1.6 and 1.8, whereas Feldstein’s estimates ranged from 1.0 to 3 depen-
ding on the income definition used. 
The subsequent literature has addressed a number of pitfalls that plagued the seminal 
papers and also highlighted the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative specifications 
and data. A crucial issue has been to separate the impact of tax policy from other factors 
that may have affected the evolution of incomes. In the US, cuts in marginal tax rates 
among high-income earners occurred concomitantly with rising income inequality, a 
development that easily can produce large ETI estimates even absent much impact from 
tax policy. The contributors following Lindsey’s and Feldstein’s papers have typically 
arrived at much smaller ETIs than their predecessors. There is, however, substantial 
variation in the reported estimates. 
The post-Feldstein contributions to the U.S. literature include papers by Auten and 
Carroll (1999), Samartino and Weiner (1997), Gruber and Saez (2002), Kopczuk 
(2005), Saez (2003), Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) and Giertz (2006). Giertz (2004) 8  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
provides a recent survey of this literature. These studies typically adopt instrumental 
variables estimation of “difference specifications”, i.e., they regress changes in income 
on changes in the net-of-tax share while treating the tax variable as endogenous. A very 
brief summary of the results reads as follows: (i) ETI is typically positive, although not 
always  so; (ii) ETI is typically well below unity, although not always so; (iii) the 
“preferred estimates” are typically located in a range between 0.2 and 0.5. 
Three studies have examined the effects of the Swedish tax reform 1990-91, viz. 
Hansson (2007), Ljunge and Ragan (2005) and Selén (2002). Ljunge and Ragan are 
most explicit about theoretical interpretations and consider alternative  behavioral 
assumptions,  including a static model as well as versions of life-cycle models. 
Empirically, all studies boil down to conventional difference specifications and report 
estimates of ETI in a range between 0.2 and 0.4. Selén also briefly looks at the tax 
reforms during the 1990s and reports estimates of ETI close to zero. A study on 
Norwegian data by Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) present ETI estimates close to zero, 
hovering between -0.6 and 0.2.
6
3  The Swedish tax system 
 
Despite a good deal of research, there is thus considerable dispersion of the esti-
mates. The reasons for the differences are not well understood. The definition of income 
seems to matter, but it is not clear exactly how and why. The results are sensitive to 
sample selection rules, but exactly how remains unclear. And the strategies employed to 
control for exogenous income trends seem to affect the results. 
A major tax reform took place in Sweden in 1990 and 1991 (see Agell et al, 1996, for 
details). The reform involved broadening of the tax bases and cuts of the statutory 
marginal income tax rates. An important ingredient was the introduction of a dual in-
come tax, where earned income and income from capital were taxed according to differ-
rent schedules. The new proportional capital income tax, levied on dividends, interest 
                                                 
6 Roine and Waldenström (2008) also examine income responsiveness to marginal tax rates using Swedish time series 
on marginal tax rates and income shares for top earners  for the period 1943-1990. They find substantial 
responsiveness at the very top, but their aggregate approach makes direct comparisons with the micro studies 
problematic. IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  9 
income and capital gains, was set to 30 percent and has remained at this level. The tax 
on earned income consists of two parts, one “local” and one national. The local income 
tax – determined by the local and regional governments – is proportional to income 
(above a basic deduction) but varies across localities. In 1991, the national average of 
the local income tax rates stood at 31 percent. On top of the local income tax, a national 
(state) tax kicked in at a rate of 20 percent for earned taxable incomes above a level that 
corresponded to the 75
th percentile of the distribution of taxable incomes. By 1991, the 
income tax schedule pertaining to earned income thus involved two brackets with 
(average) marginal rates of 31 and 51 percent. 
Although the main features of the new tax system have remained intact over the 
following years, several changes have taken place. One important change took place in 
1995 when the national tax rate was raised to 25 percent. This system was modified 
1999 when two brackets – 20 and 25 percent – for the national tax was introduced. This 
basic structure remains in place as of 2008. By 1999, the top rate kicked in at around the 
95
th percentile of the distribution of taxable incomes. 
We use mainly two sources of exogenous variations in tax policies that should enable 
identification of behavioral responses. A first source is the changes in the statutory 
national tax rate: the increase from 20 to 25 percent in 1995 and the introduction in 
1999 of a two-bracket system. The 1999 reform implied that some individuals actually 
experienced cuts in the marginal tax rate since the threshold for the 25 percent rate was 
increased. A second source is the discretionary changes in the income thresholds which 
determine when the national tax kicks in; tax payers close to the threshold may be 
exposed to changes in the marginal tax rate through these bracket adjustments. The local 
tax rates have changed very little over the studied period; the average rates have 
hovered between 30 and 31 percent. Actual individual local tax rates are affected by 
mobility decisions and should be treated as endogenous. 
Taxable income is obtained after various deductions from gross income. First, there 
are work-related deductions that may be requested by the tax payers and will be scruti-
nized by the tax authorities. Expenses caused by travel to work are the typical examples; 
such expenses are deductible if they exceed a certain amount. To arrive at taxable 
income, two further deductions are undertaken without any involvement by the tax 10  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
payer. There is a “basic deduction” (grundavdrag) and there are social security fees that 
have been partly or wholly deductible. The basic deduction varies with the level of 
assessed income
7
4  The data 
 up to a ceiling and takes a hump-shaped pattern, whereby the effective 
marginal tax rate is reduced at low incomes and increased over a range of incomes 
higher up in the distribution. Employee social security fees became increasingly impor-
tant during the 1990s and had reached 7 percent of assessed income by the end of the 
decade. These fees are proportional up to a ceiling beyond which the marginal rate is 
zero. They involve some actuarial elements, however, and should not be treated as 
analogous to ordinary taxes. 
In addition to the abovementioned ingredients of the tax system, there are some 
progressive features in the systems for housing allowances and child care fees. We have 
no information at our disposal regarding how these characteristics vary across individ-
uals in our data set. 
The data come from a longitudinal data base, LINDA, which is a 3.35 percent random 
sample of the Swedish population. LINDA is based on a combination of several reg-
isters, for example income tax registers and population censuses.
8
In addition to rich information on incomes, the data include information on human 
capital attributes as well as some demographic characteristics (such as age, gender, 
education and marital status). We have added information on local labor market con-
 From this data base, 
all individuals aged 20 to 59 are extracted for 12 consecutive years, viz. from 1991 to 
2002. We focus on the years following the major tax reform of 1990–91, thus avoiding 
the complications associated with the changes in capital income taxation that were part 
of that reform. The unbalanced panel includes about 1.9 million observations whereas 
the balanced panel comprises 113 904 individuals observed during 12 years (in total 1 
366 848 observations). The regression models will be estimated on the balanced panel. 
                                                 
7 Assessed income is gross income minus work-related deductions. More information on income definitions are given 
below. 
8 For a description of LINDA, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000). IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  11 




 Labor market conditions matter for bargaining outcomes and influence 
the risk of being quantity-constrained in labor supply decisions. 
The fraction of tax payers affected by the national tax has hovered between 19 and 
26 percent over the period 1991–2002. The top national rate of 25 percent has affected 
around 5 percent of the tax payers since its introduction in 1999. Although there have 
been no drastic changes in the statutory income tax rates, the changes that have occurred 
as well as “bracket switching” entail a non-trivial number of tax changes that can be 
taken as exogenous to individual behavior. To illustrate, consider a measure of the 
change in the individual marginal tax rate,  , of the form 
(1)  [ ] ( ) 1 11 ˆ (1 ); ; it it t it t Y gz Y z tt t - -- D= + -  
where subscript i refers to individual i,  1 it Y -  refers to taxable income as of year t-1, g is 
the general growth in incomes and  t z  (as well as  1 t z - ) captures the tax code. The first 
term on the right-hand side is the predicted marginal tax rate pertaining to year t and the 
second term is the actual marginal tax rate in year t-1. Eq. (1) gives a measure of the 
change in the marginal tax rate that is independent of fluctuations in the individual 
income level. Over the period 1992–2002, there are around 74 000 observations where 
ˆ 0.05 it t D‡  holds, i.e., where the marginal tax rate increases or decreases by at least 5 
percentage points. All these changes take place in the upper half of the income distri-
bution and three quarters of them occur in 1995 and 1999, i.e., the years when changes 
in the statutory tax rates kick in. Over 70 percent of these changes pertain to men.
10
There are a number of income variables in the data. We focus on labor income and 
entrepreneurial income, with or without associated taxable transfer payments, and 
 
                                                 
9  We are grateful to Kerstin Johansson for giving us access to these  data. The local labor market is based on the 
commuting patterns of individuals in 284 municipalities of Sweden, resulting in 100 local labor markets. The tightness 
measure is defined as the number of  vacant jobs divided by the number of job seekers registered at the public 
employment offices.  The number of job seekers is the sum of the stock of openly unemployed and the stock of 
participants in active labor market programs.  
10 The local tax rate is set at the national average in these calculations (which pertain to the balanced panel). The measure 
is thus not affected by changes in tax rates that are due to residential mobility.  12  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
exclude income from capital and capital gains.
11 Most social transfers are taxed as labor 
income; this includes for example unemployment benefits and sickness benefits. We 
consider mainly three income concepts: earned  income  (YE),  which includes labor 
income  but excludes social transfers;  broad  income  (YB), which includes taxable 
transfers in addition to earned income; and assessed income (YA), which equals broad 
income minus work-related deductions. We do not explicitly study movements in tax-
able income (YT), the reason being that taxable income is essentially a nonlinear func-
tion of the other income variables. As mentioned, taxable income equals assessed in-




 shows some descriptive statistics concerning the various income variables. 
Earned income exhibits much more variation than the other income variables, a fact that 
reflects that transfers are excluded from earned income but included in the other income 
measures. Transfers produce a sizeable level difference between broad income and earn-
ed income; the average difference between the two measures amounts to almost 10 per-
cent (not shown in the table). The correlation matrix reveal a high degree of correlation 
between changes in broad income and assessed income but more modest correlations 
between earned income and the other income variables. 
The fraction of people with positive earned income has hovered between 85 and 87 
percent over the period 1993–2002. The fraction fell sharply (from 91 to 86 percent) 
over the period 1991–1993, when a deep recession hit the Swedish economy. The 
fraction with positive broad income has been around 95 percent over the period 1993–
2002. The fraction of entrepreneurial income in earned income has been 6 percent on 
average. Women accounts for 49 percent of the sample. 
The income distribution has widened over the period. Table 2 shows the evolution of 
incomes by various percentiles. For earned income, the growth in real income has been 
5 percent for the 10
th percentile and 40 percent for the 99
th percentile. Aside from these 
divergent trends at the bottom and the top, there are modest increases in income 
                                                 
11  Entrepreneurial income captures self-employment income associated with unincorporated businesses. Owners of 
incorporated businesses receive their compensation in the form of wages and salaries. 
12 In LINDA, these three measures correspond to (i) “primärinkomst” (CPRIM), (ii) “sammanräknad förvärvsinkomst” 
(CSFVI) and (iii) “taxerad förvärvsinkomst”. Taxable income corresponds to “beskattningsbar förvärvsinkomst”  in 
LINDA. IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  13 
inequality in the major part of the distribution. These broad patterns hold for both men 
and women as well as for all four measures of income. 
Table 1 Income correlations and other statistics, 1991-2002. 
  ln YE  ln YB  ln YA  ln YT 
         
ln YE  1.000       
         
ln YB  0.727 
[0.560] 
1.000     
         




1.000   
         







         








         








         
# observations  1 660 041  1 828 182  1 827 065  1 794 674 
Notes: YE, YB, YA and YT stand for earned, broad, assessed and taxable income. The total number of 
observations is 1 913 038. The last row reports the number of observations with positive YE, YB, YA and 
YT, respectively. Numbers in brackets refer to first differences of log incomes. The age range is 20–59. 
The table is based on the unbalanced panel. 
 
Table 2 Real income increases (%) by percentiles, 1991-2002. 
  p10  p25  p50  p75  p90  p95  p99 
Taxable income  3.4  35.3  35.3  30.7  35.2  35.3  44.9 
               
Assessed income  5.9  27.7  29.2  30.7  33.7  35.3  44.9 
               
Broad income  4.6  27.7  29.2  30.7  32.2  35.3  41.6 
               
Earned income  4.6  23.3  32.2  32.2  32.2  35.3  40.0 
Note: The table is based on the unbalanced panel and compares income levels by percentiles in 1991 and 
2002. 
 
Previous research, largely based on U.S. data, has often tried to identify income re-
sponses to cuts in marginal tax rates by using data showing sharply widening income 
differentials. A difficulty that arises in this setting is to separate the effects of tax cuts 
from other determinants of increasing income dispersion. If the tax cuts are concen-
trated at the top, there is an obvious risk that the income responses will be overstated. 
The risk of overestimating the income responses should be smaller in the Swedish 14  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
setting. The main statutory tax change has involved a tax hike rather than a tax cut for 
top incomes, something that would tend to underestimate rather than overestimate the 
income responses absent suitable controls for rising income differentials. We will, how-
ever, also control for (smooth) trend changes in the income distribution. 
5  Empirical analysis 
5.1  Preliminary evidence 
We first take a look at income changes among people “affected” and “not affected” by 
the 1995 tax hike. Two periods are considered, namely 1992–94 (the pre-reform period) 
and 1996–98 (the post-reform period). Those affected –  the treatment group –  are 
defined as those who pay state taxes in the pre-reform period. Those not affected – the 
control group – are those who don’t pay state taxes in the pre-reform period. We use the 
balanced panel and compare the growth in mean income in the treatment group with 
growth in mean income in the control group. The results are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3 Change in mean income (%) for the treatment group relative to the control 
group, 1992-94 versus 1996-98. 
  All  Age 35–49  Age 35–49 with income 
restriction 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Assessed income  -11.1   -6.1  -0.8 
Broad income  -11.3  -6.2  -1.1 
Earned income  -18.0  -7.8  -1.9 
# individuals  113 904  59 227  45 522 
Note: The restriction in column (3) pertains to the 1992–94 period and is 100 000 < Income < 2 000 000. 
The average SEK/USD exchange rate in 1993 was 7.8. 
 
The raw comparisons in column (1) reveal that income growth is substantially lower 
in the group affected by the 1995 tax hike. There are several reasons why these numbers 
will overstate the casual effect of the tax hike. First, the treatment group consists of 
generally older people and it is a well established empirical fact that earnings growth 
decline over the life cycle. Indeed, the estimates in column (2) based on prime-aged 
individuals aged 35-49 are about 50 percent lower. Second, it is plausible that people 
who happen to have exceptionally low incomes in one year will catch up during IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  15 
subsequent years. Analogous arguments hold for people who happen to have very high 
incomes in a year. The implications of this regression to the mean argument are illum-
inated in the third column which excludes very low incomes as well as very high in-
comes. The differences in income growth between treatment and control groups have 
been substantially reduced in column (3). The regression models specified and estimate-
ed in what follows will control for age (along with other covariates) as well as the ten-
dency of income to exhibit regression to the mean. 
5.2  Regression models 
Lagged adjustment to tax changes can be rationalized by several arguments including 
habit  persistence,  adjustment costs and human capital accumulation. We make no 
attempt to identify the precise mechanisms; indeed this is  difficult since different 
mechanisms may have observationally equivalent implications. The Appendix outlines 
a stylized model where market work is associated with learning by doing. An increase 
in work hours results in higher immediate income but also entitles to higher future 
income via accumulation of human capital. Market work and the existing stock of hu-
man capital are combined to invest in additional human capital. A tax reform affects 
earnings by changing hours of work as well as wages (via human capital) and there is 
gradual adjustment towards a new steady state.
13
The previous empirical literature has typically regressed changes in log income on 
changes in the log of the net-of-tax rate and a few other covariates. Our approach is a 
 
We consider a relatively flexible specification of the dynamics so as to let the data 
speak for itself. Although there is often a presumption that the response is stronger in 
the long run than in the short run, the specification is not restrictive in that respect. The 
response may be stronger in the short run than in the long run for a variety of reasons. 
For example, if a tax hike increases tax avoidance, this may well be a “one-time effect” 
rather than a gradual adjustment. Responses driven by adjustment costs or human 
capital accumulation may entail more gradualness (as in the model in the appendix). 
                                                 
13 The model in the Appendix ignores wealth effects on labor supply. The tax reforms we have considered have had 
negligible impact on average tax rates. 16  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
generalization of this benchmark formulation where the benchmark obtains as a special 
case. The basic model is written as an equation of the form 
(2)  1 2 1 1 12 1 it it it it it it i it y n nX X y ab b g g r he - -- =+ + + + + ++ 
where  it y  is log income pertaining to individual i in year t and  ln(1 ) it it n t ”-  is the log 
of the net-of-tax rate, where  it t   is the marginal tax rate. it X   is a vector of other 
regressors,  i h  is an individual-specific fixed effect and  it e  is a mean zero random error 
term. The short-run effect of interest is captured by  1 b  and the long-run effect is given 
by  12 ( ) /(1 ) bb r +- , where the assumption is that  (0,1) r ˛  holds. The specification 
incorporates “mean reversion” in the sense that income changes in a period are related 
to the previous period’s distance from long-run equilibrium. In other words, the model 
has an error correction specification which can be written as follows: 








D = D +D + - - + + + + Œœ ￿￿ - Łł ºß
 
where  12 bbb ”+ and  12 ggg ”+. The squared brackets include the error correction 
term which is zero in long-run equilibrium. 
The individual-specific fixed effects can be removed by first differencing. We obtain 
(4)  1 2 1 1 12 1 it it it it it it it y n nX X y b b g gr e - -- D = D + D +D +D + D +D  
which is equivalent to 
(4¢)  ( )
2
1 1 2 1 1 12 1 it it it it it it it y n nX X y b bb g g r e - -- D = D + + D +D +D + D +D  
The remainder error term and the differenced lagged dependent variable is correlated 
(since the former contains  1 it e -   and the latter  1 it y - ). Anderson and Hsiao (1981) 
suggested the use of either  2 it y -  or  2 23 it it it yyy --- D= - as instrument for  1 it y - D ; such 
instruments are valid as long as  it e   is not serially correlated. The use of  2 it y -   as 
instrument is known as the “level” form of the Anderson and Hsiao estimator, whereas 
the use of  2 it y - D  is referred to as the “difference” estimator. An advantage of the level 
estimator is that we can exploit data available from year t=3 and onwards (since  2 it y -  is 
available from t=3), whereas the difference estimator is not available until t=4 (since IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  17 
2 it y - D   is first available at year t=4).
14
2 it y -   Since the validity of    as instrument is 
conditional on absence of serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term,  it e , it be-
comes important to test for serial correlation. We use the Arrelano-Bond tests of first- 
and second-order correlation in the differenced residuals. Absence of serial correlation 
in  it e  would imply negative first-order autocorrelation as well as zero second-order cor-
relation in  it e D . 
An endogeneity problem specific to the problem at hand concerns the net-of-tax rate. 
This variable is clearly endogenous when the tax system is progressive. In general, we 
can write the net-of-tax rate as a function  (;) it it t n ny z = , where  t z  captures the tax 
code.
15
1 11 (;) it it t n ny z - -- =  Analogously,  . It is obvious that  it n  is endogenous because it 
depends on income in the current period. However, it is clear that  1 it n -  is also correlated 
with the error term in (4) since it contains lagged income. To deal with these issues we 





it it t n ny z - =  
(5b) 
,1
1 21 ( ;)
p Pt
it it t n ny z
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-  are predicted taxable incomes pertaining to period t and t-1, 
respectively. These predictions are based on observed taxable incomes in year t-2. We 
inflate  2 it y -  by the growth of median income between year t-2 and t (as well as between 
t-2 and t-1).
16
                                                 
14 Arellano (1989) reports that the estimator that uses instruments in levels has much smaller variances than the difference 
estimator. 
15 In the regressions, 
 The model is thus exactly identified. 
 
it y  stands for log income. With some abuse of notation, we let  it y  represent the level of income 
when discussing instruments. 
16 The national averages of the 284 local tax rates are applied when constructing the instruments since the actual local tax 
rate is endogenous to mobility decisions. For 2000-2002 we add the national average of the “church fee” (kyrkoavgiften) 
to the national average of the local tax rate so as to get a consistently defined instrument over the whole period.  18  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
Comparisons with conventional specifications 
How is our approach related to the specifications used in previous work? A conven-
tional specification involves regressing the change in income against the change in the 
net-of-tax rate and lagged levels of other covariates, i.e., 
(6)  1 it it it it y nX v bg - D =D + +  
This is the benchmark specification in Auten and Caroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez 
(2002) as well as several other studies. However, it is also commonly argued that it is 
important to control for first-period income and thus include the lagged income level as 
an additional regressor, i.e., 
(7)  11 it it it it it y nyX v bk g -- D =D + + +  
The lagged income variable may appear in a linear fashion as in (7) and in Auten and 
Carroll (1999), or as a flexible spline function as in Gruber and Saez (2002). The 
inclusion of lagged income among the right-hand side variables is typically motivated 
by mean reversion arguments, i.e., the need to control for the possibility that large 
positive (negative) shocks to income in a particular year are offset by slow (fast) income 
growth in subsequent years.
17
it n D  The endogeneity of   is recognized and the typical 
procedure is to instrument by means of lagged income and the current tax system, i.e., 




it it t n ny z - =  is used. The conventional specification is 
“implicitly dynamic” since it uses lagged income as instrument. 
We see at least two potential problems with this conventional approach. First, it fails 
to make a clear distinction between short-run and long-run effects. A common view 
seems to be that the parameter on  it n D  should capture long-run effects, at least if the 
time differencing encompasses several years. This interpretation is problematic since 
the inclusion of lagged income implies a feedback effect that should be accounted for 
when computing the long-run response. A second issue concerns the econometric 
methodology. The validity of  1 it y -  as an instrument requires that there is no first-order 
autocorrelation in  it v . This condition seems to have been largely ignored in the 
                                                 
17 Blomquist and Selin (2007) motivate the inclusion of lagged income by arguing that it serves as a proxy for unobserved 
heterogeneity that interacts with time. IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  19 
previous literature; in fact, we are unaware of any previous study in this area that 
presents autocorrelation tests.
18
1 it y -
 For reasons discussed above, lagged income is plausibly 
correlated with the error term and thus needs to be instrumented. 
To what extent can the conventional difference model be nested as a special case of 
our dynamic specification? Specification (7) is not nested within (4) since it includes 
 rather than  1 it y - D . Specification (6) can however be nested within (4) after suitable 
modifications. By imposing  2 0 br ==  in (4), we obtain a specification that is identical 
to (6) except for the treatment of the non-tax covariates included in the X-vector. A 
slight generalization of the treatment of the X-variables makes it possible to get reason-
ably congruent specifications. Note that  1 12 it it XX gg - Y”D +D  in (4) obtains as a special 
case of 
*
1 1 22 it it it XX X g lg -- Y” + -  when  21 lg g =- . The specification in (6) is then 
obtained if  12 0 gg == . In order to avoid possible endogeneity of some covariates, we 
exclude potentially endogenous t-dated covariates. In particular, variables representing 
education and marital status appear only as lagged levels, i.e., as  1 it X -  and  2 it X - . 
In summary, the conventional specification can be nested a special case of our 
general dynamic model. The key restrictions are  2 0 br == . Moreover, it is important 
to test for serial correlation when estimating the conventional model as well as our 
general dynamic model. 
5.3  Empirical results 
We focus on statutory marginal tax rates. These are the tax rates that apply to taxable 
income and consist of the local tax rate plus the national tax. A broader concept, which 
arguably may be thought of as representing the effective marginal tax rate, recognizes 
income-dependent basic deductions and social security fees. A well-informed agent, 
behaving according to the canonical labor supply model, would care about effective tax 
rates rather than the statutory ones. But the rules concerning deductions and fees are 
complex and it is not clear that they are well understood by the tax payers. The statutory 
                                                 
18 Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) do however discuss the likelihood of correlation between the error term and lagged 
income. Some of the previous studies have used two-wave panels which have precluded tests of autocorrelation of the 
differenced error term. 20  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
rules, however, are simple since they involve only two or three brackets. It may well be 
the case that the statutory rules come closer than the effective rates to what agents 
perceive as relevant for their decisions. Ultimately, this is an empirical issue. The major 
changes in the tax system over the studied period are associated with changes in 
statutory rates and bracket adjustments. By Occam's razor we opt for the simpler alter-
native and focus on results based on statutory tax rates. 
The tax reforms we study have been relevant for individuals well above median 
earnings. Recall that only 20–25 percent of the tax payers have been affected by the 
national tax and only around 5 percent by the top bracket in place since 1999. There is 
no obvious criterion, however, for choosing the appropriate limit for sample inclusion. 
Although the changes in the marginal tax rates have been most pronounced among 
people with relatively high incomes, an exclusive focus on these groups would weaken 
identification. And inclusion of all income levels would imply an implausible degree of 
homogeneity in behavior across the distribution.
19
Our data comprise 12 years, i.e., 1991 through 2002. We employ the Anderson-Hsiao 
level estimator in order to maximize the number of time periods and thus end up with 
10 years covering the period 1993–2002. The results are set out in 
  We have settled for a rule that 
includes individuals with above-median income in the beginning of the studied period. 
A cutoff rule that depends on income in the first available year (1991) minimizes the 
risk of choosing a sample based on endogenous outcomes. However, income is volatile 
and sample inclusion based on only one year’s income will miss individuals who have 
experienced temporary income cuts in that year. We have therefore computed average 
taxable income for each individual over the years 1991–94 and include in our sample 
only those with above-median average incomes. Recall that there is no major tax change 
before 1995. The robustness checks that we have undertaken, and which will be 
presented below, do not indicate that the results are very sensitive to the choice of cutoff 
point. 
Table  4.  The 
estimates correspond to eq. (2), estimated as first differences as given by eq. (4¢). In 
                                                 
19 There is some evidence from U.S. studies that high-income earners exhibit stronger responsiveness to tax changes; see 
Gruber and Saez (2002). IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  21 
addition to the tax variables, we include as covariates age squared, local labor market 
tightness and dummies for marital status, education and year.
20
Table 4 Estimation results by gender. 
 We also include controls 
for (smooth) changes in the income distribution that are unrelated to tax policy by inter-
acting log average 1991–92 income in with a linear trend. 
The instruments are strong as judged by very high F-values for inclusion of the in-
struments in the first stage. The IV-estimates are very different from the OLS results 
(not reported): OLS yields negative and large coefficients on the net-of-tax rates. These 
differences are as should be expected given a progressive tax system where the net-of-
tax rate is decreasing in income. The lagged dependent variables enter with coefficients 
in the range between 0.25 and 0.35, significantly different from zero as well as signi-
ficantly different from unity. 
  Men  Women 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Assessed income  Broad income  Earned income  Assessed income  Broad income  Earned income 
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AR(1)  -27.97  -25.73  -32.82  -19.94  -19.16  -34.31 
AR(2)  0.97  0.62  -1.59  -1.58  -1.32  -2.08 
             
# obs.  381 823  381 949  363 308  183 543  183 592  174 520 
Notes: The model is estimated in first differences (Anderson-Hsiao using lagged levels as instruments). 
The t-statistics in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-individual correlation. 
Other variables are three education categories, marital status, local labor market tightness and year 
dummies. Lagged income and the two tax variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented as 
described in the text. Controls for trends in the income distribution by means of interactions between 
income 1991 and trend polynomials as described in the text. The Arellano-Bond statistics, AR(1) and 
AR(2), are asymptotically N(0,1) and test for first-  and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals. The sample inclusion rule is based on average taxable income during 1991–94; 
observations above the median are included. 
                                                 
20 The linear age effect is not identified. Education levels (three dummies) as well as marital status are 
included as lagged levels (one and two years). The data contain information on the number of children in the 
household but the definitions are not entirely consistent over the years. We have therefore excluded this 
variable from the regression models but the results are almost identical if the variable is included. 22  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
For men, the point estimates of the long-run elasticities vary – depending on the def-
inition of income – in a range between 0.1 and 0.3 and are significantly different from 
zero. The short-run elasticities are located in a range between 0.2 and 0.3 and are also 
significantly different from zero. The tests for autocorrelation reveal negative first-order 
but no second-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. These patterns are con-
sistent with zero autocorrelation in the residuals in levels. 
For women, we are unable to detect any significant short-run or long-run effects. The 
estimates are imprecise; for example, the 95 percent confidence interval for the long-run 
elasticity pertaining to assessed income ranges from -0.17 to 0.14. The tax changes we 
have studied have affected many more men than women since they have been targeted 
at high-income earners. It should therefore generally be easier to identify behavioral 
responses among men than among women. 
 
Robustness checks 
How sensitive are the results to the chosen cutoff rules for sample inclusion? We 
consider two alternative cutoff rules based on average taxable income over the period 
1991–94. The lower cutoff corresponds to 90 percent of benchmark income level 
whereas the higher cutoff kicks in at 110 percent of the benchmark. The results (for men 
only) are shown in Table 5 and do not reveal much sensitivity to the chosen cutoff rules. 
Table 5 Estimation results for alternative cutoff rules, men. 
  Income 1991–94 at least 90 % of the benchmark  Income 1991–94 at least 110 % of the benchmark 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Assessed income  Broad income  Earned income  Assessed income  Broad income  Earned income 
             
2












             












             



























             
AR(1)  -30.01  -27.79  -35.75  -26.56  -23.93  -29.12 
AR(2)  1.41  0.87  -0.92  0.93  0.62  -0.76 
             
# obs.  417 931  418 087  393 724  335 760  335 871  322 223 
Note: See notes to Table 3. IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  23 
We have undertaken a number of other sensitivity tests. As shown in Table 6, the results 
are reasonably robust to the inclusion or exclusion of various non-tax covariates. 
Exclusion of the trends leads to higher estimated short-run elasticities but has little 
impact on the estimates of the long-run elasticities. The estimates are not much affected 
by exclusion of other variables, such as education, marital status and local labor market 
conditions. The estimated long-run elasticities tend to be somewhat smaller when we 
restrict the sample to the prime-aged groups and also when entrepreneurial income is 
excluded. 
Table 6 Further robustness checks, men. 
  Assessed income  Broad income  Earned income 





























                   













                   













                   































Notes: Few covariates mean inclusion of the tax variables, the trends, age squared and the year dummies. 
See also notes to Table 3. 
 
Comparisons with conventional specifications 
We now turn to a comparison with results that are based on the traditional difference 
specification as given by eqs. (6) and (7) above. To implement this specification, we 
follow the common practice of instrumenting the net-of-tax rate in year t by means of 








it y -  is predicted income for year t. The relevant instrument in 
the difference specification thus becomes 
,
1 11 (; ) (;)
P Pt
it it t it t n ny z ny z - -- D= - . The use of 
1 it y -  as an instrument is valid as long as there is no first-order autocorrelation in  it v . 
We include the same controls for income trends as in the previous regressions. 24  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
The results are displayed in Table 7. The three first columns correspond to eq. (6), 
whereas the remaining columns include lagged income and thus correspond to model 
(7). For men, the estimated coefficients on the net-of-tax variables range between 0.06 
and 0.11 in the first three columns. This is clearly lower than the corresponding long-
run elasticities estimated in the dynamic model; cf. Table 3. Note however that there is 
severe first-order autocorrelation in the residuals, a fact that casts doubts on the validity 
of this model. For women, the estimated parameters are tiny. 
The estimates of the net-of-tax effects for men are markedly reduced when lagged 
income is included among the regressors. The coefficients on the lagged income var-
iables are negative, which is the common finding in these kinds of specifications. For 
women, the positive point estimates turn negative. Again, there is evidence of severe 
first-order autocorrelation in the residuals. 
As noted, the dynamic specification nests the conventional formulation (for one year 
differences) as a special case; the relevant restrictions on eq. (4) are  2 0 br == . The 
restriction  0 r =  is always rejected as is clear from Table 3. The restriction  2 0 b = , 
which implies equal coefficients on 
2
it n D  and  1 it n - D , is rejected for male assessed and 
broad income but not for male earned income and female incomes. 
5.4  Fiscal consequences of a tax cut 
A frequently advocated tax reform would entail abolishment of the top bracket in the 
state income tax system.
21
t
 Such a reform, involving a 5 percentage point cut in marginal 
income tax rates for top-income earners, would restore the Swedish tax system to the 
basic principles set out in the major tax reform of the early 1990s. 
What are the fiscal consequences of such a reform? Consider a stylized represent-
tation of the tax system pertaining to high incomes, i.e., incomes above the threshold 
where the top rate kicks in. Let   represent the statutory marginal income tax rate,  i YA  
assessed income for individual i, D deductions and 
* Y  the threshold above which the  
                                                 
21 Two of the three major Swedish union federations, organizing white collar workers, have repeatedly argued in favor of 
such a reform.  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  25 
 
Table 7 Estimation results by gender, conventional difference specifications. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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AR(1)  -24.13  -21.16  -30.29  -15.60  -14.30  -12.78 
AR(2)  -9.90  -9.64  -16.21  7.89  7.19  8.54 
             
# obs.  382 344  382 453  366 236  382 344  382 453  366 236 
             
Women             












             






             
AR(1)  -16.42  -16.20  -30.00  -9.93  -7.85  -12.00 
AR(2)  -10.15  -10.05  -13.97  2.84  2.85  8.78 
             
# obs.  183 672  183 717  175 756  183 672  183 717  175 756 
             
Notes: Other variables are those included in the previous regressions (except  1 it n - D  and  1 it y - D ). 
 
top rate applies. Taxable income is given as  ii YT YA D =- , where deductions are con-
stant for top-income earners. The income tax function for the top bracket can thus be 
written as follows: 
(8)  ( )
*
ii T YA D Y t = --
 
Differentiation of the tax function with respect to the marginal tax rate yields: 










which can be written as 
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where  ln / ln(1 ) i d YA d ht ”-  is the elasticity of assessed income with respect to the net-
of-tax rate. The expression in the first parenthesis captures the direct (or mechanical) 
effect of a tax change, whereas the remaining term represents the indirect effect 26  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
associated with the income response. Note that the direct effect is negligible for incomes 
close to the threshold so  /0 i dT dt <  holds for incomes in the neighborhood of the 
threshold. 
Expression (10) captures only the impact on tax revenues that operates through the 
income tax system whereas revenue effects via payroll and value added taxes are 
ignored. By slightly modifying (8) so as to incorporate proportional payroll taxes levied 
on employers, 
e t , we obtain an expression that captures the total change in labor taxes 
associated with a change in the top marginal income tax rate: 
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The total effect on tax revenues is thus obtained as: 
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Table 8 shows the results of experiments where the top tax bracket is abolished in 2002, 
the last year in our data. We set  0.525 t =   and  0.33
e t =   (or  0
e t = ) in these 
experiments.
  22 h  Three alternatives for   are considered, viz. 0.10, 0.20 and 0.30. The 
mechanical fall in tax revenues is more than offset by the increase in tax revenues 
associated with the positive income response for  0.20 h =  or higher and with account 
taken of revenues from the payroll tax. It should be noted that these calculations provide 
lower bound estimates since we have ignored increased revenues from value added 
taxes. However, the uncertainty regarding the female elasticities cautions against strong 
conclusions about the fiscal outcomes in the Swedish case. Note also that the estimated 
elasticities may not hold for other tax reforms, such as cuts in marginal tax rates at 
lower income levels which may have non-negligible effects on average tax rates for 
high income earners. 
                                                 
22  This experiment involves calculation of  ( ) ( )
* ( ) / (1 ) 0.05 e
ii i T YA D Y YA htt t Øø D =S - - - + - · - Œœ ºß
. The summation 
pertains to all income earners above the relevant income threshold. The numbers are scaled to the macro level by dividing 
by the sample probability in LINDA, i.e., 0.0335. The calculations ignore the fact that t  varies across individuals 
(because of variations in municipality tax rates), but this has negligible effects on the results. The average marginal 
income tax rate was 55 percent in 2002 in the relevant top income interval. The proportional statutory payroll tax rate was 
32.82 percent. We place no restrictions on age in the calculations. IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  27 
Table 8 Fiscal implications of elimination of the top tax bracket ( -0.05 t D= ) in 2002. 
Millions SEK. 
  0.1 h =     0.20 h =   0.30 h =  






























             
Net effect:  T D   -1 810  -1 120  -710  670  390  2 460 
Notes: (i) ignores the payroll tax effect whereas (ii) incorporates the payroll tax effect. No age restrictions 
are imposed. The SEK/USD exchange rate in 2007 is around 7 SEK per USD. 
 
Finally, we note by inspection of (12) that the tax cut has no effect on tax revenues 





















The numerator of the left-hand side is the sum of taxable incomes above the threshold 
for the top rate, whereas the denominator is the sum of (all) assessed incomes for 
individuals above the threshold. The left-hand side is equal to 0.29 in our data. For 
0.525 t =  and  0
e t = , it follows that  0.26 h >  must hold if the tax reform should be 
revenue neutral. For  0.33
e t = , it is sufficient that  0.16 h >  holds. 
6  Concluding remarks 
We have proposed a new approach to the estimation of income responses to changes in 
marginal tax rates. The conventional approach, where changes in income are regressed 
on changes in tax rates, can only capture long-run responses under restrictive and 
implausible conditions. Our more general approach, which involves application of a 
standard lagged adjustment framework, nests the conventional specification as a special 
case and delivers estimates of both short-run and long-run effects. 
Our estimates of long-run responses among males are much larger than the estimates 
we obtain by employing the conventional difference specifications. At the same time, 
these long-run estimates are considerably smaller than some of the previous estimates in 28  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
the literature. However, our simulations of a tax reform that abolishes the top marginal 
tax rate suggest that even modest elasticities are sufficient to make such a reform 
fiscally inexpensive when we account for induced increases in revenues from payroll 
taxes and value added taxes. 
There is no evidence from our results that female incomes are more tax-responsive 
than those of men, an implication that would follow from most studies of labor supply.
23 
Our estimates for females are imprecise and statistically insignificant. However, the tax 
changes we have studied have affected many more men than women since they have 
been targeted at high-income earners. It should therefore generally be easier to identify 
behavioral responses among men than among women. The somewhat puzzling results 
for women may also be related to the fact that we have ignored the household context, 
i.e., the possibility that labor supply decisions in a two-earner family are jointly 
determined by the spouses. It should be a prioritized research agenda to incorporate a 
family perspective in this area.
24
                                                 
23 However, Blomquist and Hansson Brusewitz (1990) caution that the conventional results – higher female labor supply 
elasticities – may be artifacts of restrictive functional forms.  
24 See Gelber (2008) for a recent study along these lines (using the standard difference specification). 
 
There is a need for better understanding of how and why the estimates differ across 
alternative definitions of income. Much has been said in favor of the view that one 
should focus on taxable income since this is what matters for the effects on the 
government’s tax revenues. But perhaps this focus misses the difficulty to satisfactory 
model income variables that are complex outcomes of individual work effort as well as 
rules pertaining to tax deductions and transfers. It may well be that separate structural 
approaches to the modeling of the components of taxable income will prove to be the 
route forward. IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence  29 
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Appendix: Labor supply with learning by doing 
Consider  an infinitely-lived  individual  with an instantaneous utility function of the 
quasi-linear form  ( )
1 /1 uch
g g
+ =- + , where c is consumption, h is work hours and 
0 g > . Labor earnings is determined by wage rates, w, and work hours, i.e., Y=wh. 
Wage rates are proportional to the stock of human capital, w=RK. Human capital is 
produced by use of work hours and human capital: 
(A1) 
12
0 12 / , (0,1), (0,1) dK dt K h K
aa a da a = - ˛˛  
where  0 d > captures depreciation of human capital.  Financial assets, denoted A, 
evolves according to  / (1 ) dA dt rA RKh c t =+ -- , where r is the rate of interest and t  
is the tax rate. The individual maximizes the discounted present value of utilities. With 
quasi-linear utility, this  involves maximization of the present value of income. The 
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= -- + - Œœ + ºß  
where  l  is the multiplier associated with the human capital constraint. The necessary 
conditions for maximum include: 
(A2) 
12 1
02 (1 ) 0 h RK K h
aa g t la a
- -+ -+ =  
(A3) 
12 1
01 / ( ) (1 ) ddt r R h Kh
aa l l d t la a
- = +- --  
The dynamics of the system can be illustrated in the h,K-space (Figure A1).  Let 
(,) GKh denote the dK/dt=0 line and note that it is positively sloped. Consider also the 
dh/dt=0 line which is obtained by differentiating (A2) with respect to time and using 
(A1), (A2) and (A3) to eliminate dK/dt,  / d dt l  and l . We obtain 
(A4)  / (,) / (,) dh dt N K h D K h =  
where 
( ) ( )( ) 12
02 1 ( , ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) N K hRK h h RKr RK
aa g a t a t d da d t ” - - + - - +- - -   and 
( )
11
2 ( , ) (1 ) (1 ) 0 DKh h h R Kh
gg ga t
-- ” +- - - > . The dh/dt=0 line, denoted H(K,h), is 
positively sloped since  0 K N <  and  0 h N > . Figure A 1 illustrates the phase diagram in 34  IFAU – Estimating dynamic income responses to tax reforms: Swedish evidence 
the h,K-space under the assumption that the slope of  G(K,h) is greater than the slope of 
H(K,h), an  assumption  that  holds  for sufficiently low values of  2 a .  The optimal 
trajectory – the bold-faced arrows – is a saddle path and involves gradual adjustment 
towards the steady state where G(K,h) and H(K,h) intersects.
25 A rise in the net-of-tax 
rate shifts the H(K,h) line to the left. There is a positive steady state impact on hours of 
work as well as on wage rates (via the accumulation of human capital).  It is also 
straightforward to establish that the short-run impact of a tax cut will always entail an 




run impact on earnings is bigger than the short-run impact. 
 
 
                                                 
25 If the slope of G(K,h) is smaller than the slope of H(K,h), the outcome would be an unstable focus. 
26 To verify this claim, consider how the slope of the optimal path changes as a response to an increase in the net-of-tax 
rate. If the instantaneous impact is unambiguously positive, it must be the case the new path is always above the old one. 
The slope of the new path must be steeper than the slope of the old one in a hypothetical point of intersection (for 
dK/dt>0). Differentiation of the slope of the optimal path reveals that a tax cut reduces the slope for dK/dt>0 and 
increases the slope for dK/dt<0. Thus no intersection between new and old paths occurs. 
H 
K 
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Figure A 1.    
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